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2I. Shrinking Electoral Margins and Shifting 
Congressional Ideology  
 
In the United States, there is a unique relationship between voters and elected 
officials. Within this relationship sits the process of elections, which occurs every two 
years for US House candidates. Essentially, elected officials work within the context of 
continual electoral demands. Yet, how does this pressure affect the ideology and voting 
behavior of representatives? There are numerous academic studies that have discussed 
the effects of electoral pressure on elected officials. By understanding the relationship 
between election results and congressional voting behavior, we can develop a better 
understanding of how our elected officials work toward the goals of our nation.  
 This study attempts to gain a better understanding of what affects congressional 
voting. Specifically, will a congressman moderate his voting behavior in the face of 
shrinking electoral margins? For example, let us assume that Congressman X won his 
2000 election by a margin of five percentage points. Yet, in 2002, Congressman X faced 
a particularly weak challenger. Therefore, he won by a much more comfortable margin of 
twenty percentage points. We should then assume that the congressional voting behavior 
of Congressman X will become increasingly extreme during the coming term. Because 
Congressmen are inherently ideologically extreme, the increase in winning margin allows 
Congressman X to polarize his voting behavior. Several studies regarding congressional 
voting behavior are cited in the discussion of whether this hypothesized relationship 
between voting trends and electoral results actually exists. 
 
3A. ELECTIONS 
 
For a research project on shifting ideology, it is important to first understand the 
nature of elections in American politics. How does the environment and frequency of 
elections affect the American political realm? Congressional election results alone are not 
sufficient to understand the political process and voting ideology. Many scholars focus on 
the institution of continual electoral pressure as the principal explanation for political 
incapacity and congressional stalemate in the House.  
Gary Jacobson sees congressional elections as a complex arrangement of multiple 
working plots and strategic goals. He also considers electoral influence on the behavior of 
elected leaders. Jacobson believes that elections shape the course led by our elected 
officials (Jacobson, 2004, 3). In effect, congressmen vote and attempt to hold office 
within the confines of a complicated balancing act. However, Jacobson notes that the 
coherence of electoral coalitions has arisen in Congress, which has subsequently 
“contributed to greater consistency in voting behavior” (Bond, 2002, 19). Party loyalty 
among voters has risen, while ticket splitting has diminished since the 1970s (Bond, 
2002, 19). 
Scholars have also noted that presidential vote totals can serve as a vital indicator 
of congressional electoral activities. Jacobson discusses this facet of voting behavior in 
the context of the rise of party loyalty. Jacobson states that “the simple correlation 
between a party’s district-level House and presidential vote shares has risen sharply from 
its low point in 1972” (Bond, 2002, 20). Presidential election results indicate a high level 
of efficiency of Republican congressional districts. For example, although Vice President 
4Al Gore outpolled George W. Bush by several hundred thousand votes nationally in the 
2000 presidential election, Bush outpolled Gore in 238 House districts in 2002 (after 
redistricting). Thus, Jacobson demonstrates that Republican redistricting put Democrats 
at a significant structural disadvantage in the House (Jacobson, 2004, 251). 
Meanwhile, David Mayhew has suggested several theoretical views on 
congressional elections. In his study on vanishing electoral marginals (1974), Mayhew 
focused on House elections on a macro scale. Mayhew was interested in net election 
shifts per Congress, rather than shifts in particular districts. According to Mayhew’s 
research, elections have always been heavily won by incumbents. Yet, he suggests that if 
the trends of the 1960s hold, we may be witnessing a further “blunting of a blunt 
instrument” (Mayhew, 1974, 314). Mayhew’s notion of vanishing marginals speaks to the 
core of a hypothesis concerning shifting ideology for electoral success. Have 
representatives “gotten better” at achieving reelection, and has it been at the expense of 
consistent political ideology?  
 Mayhew additionally outlines this general trend in his book, The Electoral 
Connection (1975). Mayhew’s work focuses on the hypothesis that reelection is the 
primary concern of congressional incumbents. Mayhew notes that “all members of 
Congress have a primary interest in reelection. Some members have no other interest” 
(Mayhew, 1975, 16). Reelection has become the principal goal of elected officials, and 
thus, it is expected that shifts in ideology will occur alongside rises in reelection rates. 
This would explain why shifting voting behavior occurs in the face of electoral pressure.  
However, Mayhew’s thesis must be scrutinized. As has been seen in 
congressional data since Mayhew’s publication in 1974, there has actually been a 
5deepening party differential in the last thirty years. Keith Poole (1997) and Alan 
Abramowitz (2001) cite the increasing role of party leadership and party identification in 
the last thirty years. Although Mayhew’s theory remains a quintessential text for studying 
congressional elections, Abramowitz notes that it was published in 1974, “at what may 
have been the low point of party influence in Congress during the twentieth century” 
(Abramowitz, 2001, 257). Nevertheless, the ineffectiveness of Mayhew’s hypothesis does 
not debunk the connection between voting behavior and electoral results. Rather, it 
simply complicates the direction of a possible causal connection. 
 Lastly, Robert Erikson and Gerald Wright suggest that “elections contribute 
significantly to achieving congressional representation” (Erikson, 1980, 91). Erikson 
argues that Republican challengers are more conservative than Republican incumbents, 
and likewise, that Democratic challengers are more liberal than Democratic incumbents 
(Erikson, 1980, 95). Essentially, Erikson maintains that elections place a different set of 
pressures on those in office from those attempting to gain office. Representation will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section, but Erikson’s theory would suggest that 
House member ideology is better predicted by district opinion than by party affiliation 
(Erikson, 1980, 96). 
 
B. REPRESENTATION 
 
Representative government serves as an important intermediary between elections 
and ideology. As previously discussed, there have been competing theories proposed on 
6the role of congressional representation. Under what is termed as the popular model of 
representative democracy, an elected official is a delegate to his constituents. His role is 
to serve the voting interests of his constituents. Yet, this model is one of the more 
idealistic models of voting. It presumes that the constituency of an elected official will be 
active enough to fully convey majority issue positions, or respond to media-based 
surveys on such topics. Through Madison’s Federalist no. 10, majority rule came to be 
regarded as tyranny of the masses. Instead, a responsible model is a more useful account 
of American politics for the electorate (Erikson, 1980, 92). The responsible model 
classifies our elected officials as trustees whom we elect to represent us because we 
believe in their general viewpoints and decision making ability.  
 Through the responsible model, representation is recognized as a unique interplay 
between constituent affairs and congressional voting. Although congressmen are 
generally receptive to constituent positions on key votes, representatives will often vote 
their conscience on issues close to them. This interaction between representatives and 
their constituents is significant in a discussion on voting ideology. Are changes in 
congressional voting behavior the product of representatives acting as delegates? Or, 
from a somewhat pessimistic standpoint, are such shifts representationally expensive 
attempts to gain reelection? In either case, the theory implies that there exists a 
relationship between electoral pressure and congressional voting behavior. 
 According to Morris Fiorina, the relationship between constituent influences and 
representatives varies widely among representatives (1982). Specifically, Fiorina notes 
that “a high degree of electoral competition ‘sensitizes’ a representative to constituents’ 
preferences” (Fiorina, 1982, 4). Fiorina’s studies on constituent effects report fairly weak 
7relationships between constituency characteristics and congressional voting behavior 
(Fiorina, 1982, 19). Yet, in understanding Fiorina’s argument, there is a critical 
distinction between his work and this paper’s contention that diminishing electoral results 
lead to a moderation of voting ideology. Fiorina’s focus is on constituent attentiveness 
and its role on congressional behavior. Although constituent activity is important, 
Fiorina’s study is more focused and based upon substantially less data than this study. 
 Meanwhile, Douglas Arnold has also written on representation and its relationship 
between ideology and constituent behavior. Arnold (1990) looks at representation and 
theorizes on how exactly Congress comes to adopt its policies. Arnold believes that 
decision making by representatives is heavily constrained by citizens and coalition 
leaders. In essence, congressmen are constantly being squeezed on both ends. This 
interaction between party goals and constituent desires leads congressmen to walk a tight 
rope that can “impel legislators to support policies that serve either particularistic or 
general interests” (Arnold, 1990, 6). By proposing that political action is based upon the 
tug of war between varying interests, Arnold suggests that congressional voting behavior 
is at least partially, if not mostly, influenced by a representative’s electoral and party 
status. 
 Nevertheless, the role of congressional representation was examined by Miller 
and Stokes in 1968 (Erikson, 1980, 101). Miller and Stokes hoped to determine whether a 
correlation exists between constituency opinion and representative policy positions. The 
correlation they found was remarkably low, yet some have suggested that this study had 
severe sampling errors. Erikson believes that the study indicates flaws in the “traditional 
8test of constituency-representative correlations,” and that constituency opinion is strongly 
related to representation (Erikson, 1980, 101).  
 
C. IDEOLOGY 
 
The third quintessential component of studies regarding congressional voting is 
political ideology. The essence of representation manifests itself in the ideological views 
of each congressman serving in the United States House of Representatives. Not only is 
ideology manifested through representation, but ideology serves as a benchmark measure 
to “size up” our elected officials. The flow of congressional action can be described as a 
circular pattern. Elections lead to representation by a congressman, which is then judged 
by the voting public through a dissection of that representative’s voting ideology. In 
theory, if the majority of that voting population approves of its representative’s 
ideological voting patterns, he will be reelected, thus making ideology a significant value 
in measuring representation and electability. 
 A noteworthy sum of literature on congressional ideology has focused on the 
history of voting behavior. Richard Elling (1982) used the US Senate as a benchmark to 
study whether senators vote differently depending on how deep they are within their 
term. Because senators have a six year gap between elections, it is possible that voting 
behavior may differ greatly in year two as opposed to year six of a senator’s term. Elling 
remarks that some ideological moderation usually occurs during the final years of a 
senator’s term, and patterned instability did shift, generally, in the direction of ideological 
9moderation (Elling, 1982, 75). Late-term ideological moderation would support the 
theory that elections play a role in congressional ideological moderation. 
Thomas Stratmann (2000) has taken a similar approach to voting behavior within 
congressional terms. However, Stratmann examines aggregate voting over congressional 
careers rather than within single terms. According to Stratmann’s model, junior 
congressmen are more likely to vote with their party, thus holding a fairly ideological 
line. Party line voting and variability of voting decision does decrease with seniority 
though. Lastly, Stratmann observes that voting behavior often shifts, particularly after 
redistricting of congressional districts. Because seniority is generally positively correlated 
with increasing electoral margins (safe seats), we can take his study as support that 
congressional voting will moderate during times of electoral stress.  
Similarly, party leadership plays a vital role in the ideological platform of each 
party. Abramowitz (2001) notes the increasing role of party leadership in general politics 
and party cohesion. According to Abramowitz, party leaders “no longer leave members 
alone” when it comes to voting behavior (Abramowitz, 2001, 258). Further, party leaders 
are supposed to represent the ideal values and direction of the party, which plays an 
enormous role in contemporary politics. Party leaders are often quite ideological during 
their time at the helm of their party. 
 Meanwhile, Amihai Glazer and Mark Robbins (1985) also use the general 
occurrence of redistricting as their benchmark for studying shifting ideology among 
congressmen. Their data generally concur with Stratmann’s: congressmen who 
successfully gain reelection in redistricted constituencies are those who have shifted their 
voting behavior to match their new electorate. This supports the notion that incumbent 
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vulnerability is dependent on an elected official creating policy congruity between 
himself and his constituents (Whitby, 1986). 
 Nonetheless, it is important to focus on dissenting views regarding the theory of 
congressional strategic moderation. Robert Bernstein (1988) proposes there is little 
evidence that senators moderate their ideology due to upcoming reelection bids. 
According to Bernstein, it is a misnomer that approaching elections lead senators to 
moderate their voting behavior. Such a hypothesis assumes that the median voter in a 
district will be closer to the senator’s opponent, which does not always occur (Bernstein, 
1988, 238). In fact, certain representatives may become increasingly ideological leading 
up to an election due to a variety of factors, including attempts to acquire financial and 
human resources by mobilizing the strength of the representative’s party. A study on 
changes in voting behavior must take ancillary circumstances into account when 
attempting to accumulate a general trend of ideological shifts. 
 Lastly, Kalt and Zupan (1990) use an economically-based model to study 
ideological shirking among congressmen. Termed “Principal-Agent Slack”, Kalt and 
Zupan believe that electoral slack given to senators allows them to act within their own 
ideological boundaries (Kalt and Zupan, 1990, 105). In discussing their results of 
senatorial ideological shirking, Kalt and Zupan reflect on the implications of ideological 
shifting by congressional leaders: 
To denote the ideology residual as ideological shirking amounts to saying that marginally 
uncaptured legislators vote their convictions. The normative implications of this 
conclusion turn on views of both the proper purpose of representatives in a democracy 
and the aggregate performance of representative democracy. (Kalt and Zupan, 1990, 128) 
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D. THREE THEORIES OF IDEOLOGY/REPRESENTATION INTERPLAY 
 
From the aforementioned discussion on elections, representation, and ideology, 
the interplay between constituent behavior and representative ideology can be classified 
under three main theories. The first theory on electoral behavior advocates that 
congressmen are inherently ideologically extreme. Electoral success determines how 
much intrinsic ideological polarity a congressman can display in his voting behavior. 
Some scholars have suggested that landslide congressional elections serve as a mandate 
to House members, allowing them to enact change in whatever manner they see fit. 
Accordingly, after a strong showing in an election cycle, “Members of the advantaged 
party will be emboldened by new evidence of electoral support for their preferred 
positions” (Peterson, 2003, 413). All legislators hold policy positions that rest fairly 
conservative or liberal, however, it is the leeway provided by sweeping election returns 
that will decide how accurately legislators can represent their own views through their 
voting record. 
 Meanwhile, an alternative, more constituent-driven theory of congressional 
behavior suggests that congressional voting trends are a response to constituent demands. 
Whereas the former theory states that each legislator wishes to advocate his own, inherent 
views, the latter theory suggests that congressional voting ideology aligns in response to 
cues from the electorate. Erickson suggests that changes in policy representation “may 
also be the result of candidates responding directly to district ideology” (Erickson, 1980, 
103). Similarly, the work of Bernstein (1988) and Glazer (1985) observes that 
congressional voting behavior is primarily driven by constituent opinion. 
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 As Morris Fiorina suggests, the representative is purposive in his voting behavior, 
and this is why he aligns his votes with his constituency. As Fiorina notes, “his votes are 
not simply passive responses to role expectations, group memberships, and interest group 
pressures…[but] with an eye toward achieving valued consequences” (Fiorina, 1974, 29). 
Representatives value the offices in which they serve, and reasonability in voting (voting 
with district preferences) will help to ensure representatives maintain these positions. As 
Fiorina bluntly states, “realistically or cynically as the case may be, we believe that 
constituents’ preferences are reflected in a representative’s voting primarily through his 
concern for his electoral survival” (Fiorina, 1974, 31). 
 Finally, a third theory of ideological influences, promoted by Marc Hetherington 
(2001), suggests that the relationship between representatives and constituents is different 
than the model suggested by Erickson and Fiorina. According to Hetherington, as the 
ideology of legislators becomes increasingly conservative or liberal, the ideology of the 
public will subsequently shift in the same direction. Hetherington proposes that elite 
polarization clarifies public perceptions of ideological differences between the parties, 
creating an increasing ideological divide among the public (Hetherington, 2001, 619). 
Whereas Erickson and Fiorina believe that legislators act in accordance with the cues 
provided by their constituents, Hetherington believes that constituents actually follow the 
cues of their legislators, and by extension, cues provided by the parties. At that point, 
representatives consequently shift their behavior to mirror their constituency, creating an 
inexhaustible cycle of shifting ideology. Party separation has increased in the last twenty 
years, and subsequently, Americans today are more likely to think about one party 
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positively and one negatively than thirty years ago (Hetherington, 2001, 628). Thus, the 
increasing ideological polarization of Congress has created a more partisan electorate. 
 
E. FINAL NOTES 
 
Constituent behavior leads to representation through elections. Representation in 
each district leads to varying congressional ideologies. Logically, the next conclusion 
would be that constituent behavior creates the ideologies that represent them in Congress. 
The idea that the voting populace can affect congressional ideology is the critical 
backbone of research on shifting voting ideology. Does electoral pressure have the 
institutional clout to shift the ideology of Congress? The aforementioned theories, 
although conflicting in different facets, all hold one critical component in common: there 
is a correlation between congressional voting behavior (ideology) and electoral success 
(public opinion). The general consensus of the academic community is that shifts in 
congressional voting behavior may vary based on electoral pressure, but the dynamics of 
the relationship are not universally agreed upon. 
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II. Data and Methods: Shifting Congressional 
Ideology 
 
Although studies of the US Congress are often qualitative, quantitative studies can 
provide a superlative angle for analyzing lawmaking. As has been noted in previous 
sections, there exists a unique relationship between electoral results and congressional 
voting behavior. This research project hypothesizes that congressional ideological 
extremity will vary based on electoral success. However, there are numerous variables 
that can affect congressional voting behavior. This research focuses on the House of 
Representatives, and it employs quantitative analysis of congressional ideology in the US 
House of Representatives. 
There are several advantages of focusing on Congress from a quantitative angle. 
Foremost, quantifying this information allows research to examine a large amount of 
data, spanning the most recent 106 years of the US House of Representatives. 
Theoretically, using data through all 107 Congresses would be better, however this 
created several logistical problems. First, much of the election data for early 
congressional races is either missing or erroneous. Second, a steady two party foundation 
did not take hold immediately in the United States. Rather, many earlier congressional 
elections exhibited a multiple party dynamic that would have a confounding affect on the 
analysis.  
Regardless, a quantitative study using 106 years of data makes it possible to 
theorize about various types of congressional behavior, often occurring over a long 
period of time. Additionally, a quantitative approach minimizes the influx of selection 
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bias. Introduction of error is a critical concern of any researcher, and the use of an 
unbiased, comprehensive quantitative design can go a long way to preventing error from 
minimizing the results of political research. 
Yet, many studies of congressional behavior have approached the topic from a 
perspective of participant observer. Although such studies provide the researcher with a 
first-hand look at congressional decision-making, qualitative studies on Congress present 
several disadvantages. First, many instances of significant political behavior are not 
accessible to examination (Johnson and Reynolds, 2005, 194). Also, participant 
observation can sometimes, often unintentionally, become plagued with observer bias. 
Moreover, a researcher may form a perfectly unbiased and structured research plan, yet 
the results of his case studies may simply prove unrepresentative of congressional 
behavior as a whole (Johnson and Reynolds, 2005, 195). Because the purpose of this 
study is to generate a better understanding of the effects of electoral pressure on 
congressional voting behavior as a whole, its hypotheses and methodology will be 
grounded in exhaustive quantitative research methods. 
 
A. DATA 
 
Seemingly, the dependent variable of this study should be a measure of the net 
change in ideology. However, how is one supposed to measure changes in ideology 
simply through examination of the congressional voting record? To achieve this goal, a 
set of numerical ideological scores can be used to calculate this change. The most 
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contemporary and significant data set in existence on ideology through congressional 
voting was created by two scholars, Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal (2005). Poole 
and Rosenthal describe voting behavior not as a set of factions, but instead as a 
continuum of flexible positions (Poole, 1997, 4). This continuum effectively breaks down 
along ideological lines, creating predictability across varying policy issues. It can be 
expected that a congressman who favors higher minimum wages will also favor lower 
defense spending and affirmative action policies (Poole, 1997, 4). Thus, through analysis 
of Poole and Rosenthal’s data-set, it is possible to gain an efficient understanding of 
congressional voting patterns and behavior. 
 Yet, Poole and Rosenthal discuss several caveats of their research that must be 
noted before their data are used for further study. Primarily, one must understand that the 
ideological rankings received through their data do not lead to a predictive model on 
specific issues. Poole and Rosenthal’s study gives political scientists the ability to predict 
short-term voting results, but their study is not issue-driven. Poole and Rosenthal’s main 
goal is to illustrate that vote mapping generally shows that voting will be consistent with 
party ideological structure (Poole, 1997, 5).  
 Also, certain circumstances must be recognized when discussing aggregate shifts 
in ideology. The main hypothesis of this research is that congressional ideology will 
moderate in the face of diminishing electoral margins. However, this hypothesis works 
under a critical assumption, and one that must be discussed. This hypothesis assumes that 
all US House districts are moderate, yet this is not entirely true. As Bernstein (1988) 
suggests, the median voter in congressional districts are not always closer to an 
opponent’s ideology. For instance, some districts are quite conservative or liberal. Let us 
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assume that Congressman Y, with a 0.2 ideology, serves in a heavily conservative district 
where the median voter is a 0.6. In the last several elections, his margin of victory has 
shrunk substantially. How would Congressman Y act in order to reverse this trend? 
Contrary to the original hypothesis, Congressman Y would become increasingly 
conservative to regain the votes he had lost. Although this instance would, in fact, 
support the theory that is being tested, its occurrence within the data set would skew the 
results of a correlation study. Using proper control factors, discussed in the forthcoming 
section on independent variables, allows the regression analysis to avoid the data from 
working against itself. 
 
B. DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
Ideology will be the main dependent variable for this study. Poole and Rosenthal 
(2005) will serve as the data source for defining ideology, and it is important to discuss 
the exact parameters of Poole and Rosenthal’s definition of “ideology”. The data set they 
use ranks each representative throughout the history of Congress on a scale from -1 to 1, 
and this study has cross examined this variable against several others.  
Studies by both David Mayhew (1974, 1975) and Morris Fiorina (1982) have 
discussed the importance of voting ideology and its relation to congressional success. 
Mayhew has theorized that the primary goal of congressional work is reelection, and such 
a theory could be supported through the results of this study. Ideology is a strong, 
unbiased baseline to study congressional behavior. As a measure of congressional 
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actions, ideology will be calculated against a variety of variables, most notably election 
returns, to see how ideology varies in response to changes in electoral security. 
Why exactly is ideology a strong measure to compare with electoral results? 
Ideology is measured based on the actual voting behavior of all House members 
throughout history. As such, there is no selection bias or issues of over-selection or 
under-selection of certain groups; every congressional member is selected. However, it 
must be noted that some election data was removed before the regression data was 
compiled, and this will be discussed shortly.  
However, because this study intends to demonstrate dynamic ideological shifts 
occurring by members pressured by reelection, the W-NOMINATE (which will be 
referred to as WNOM through this paper) and DW-Nominate scores provided by Poole 
and Rosenthal will not suffice. The DW-Nominate scores themselves create a “best line” 
scenario within the WNOM data points. The DW- Nominate line creates a trend line over 
the career of each congressman. Because the effectiveness of this study depends on the 
dynamic changes between each Congress, an average line will not effectively measure 
ideological shift. This is shown below. 
Table 1. 
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Thus, several derivative measures were calculated using this data to resolve this issue. 
Poole and Rosenthal did not include this study’s main complex variable within their 
original discussion and ideology data, however Keith Poole (2005) discusses the efficacy 
and theory behind the variable constructed for this study’s data in his most recent book.  
 According to Poole, the WNOM scores essentially serve as a “static” version of 
the D-Nominate scores released by Poole and Rosenthal (Poole, 1997, 249). The scores 
correspond to individual ideology scores, by Congress, for a given representative. For 
instance, Table 2 below shows Congressman Christopher Shays (R-CT) and his 
individual WNOM Scores: 
 
Congress WNOM 
100 0.066 
101 0.108 
102 0.123 
103 0.120 
104 0.149 
105 0.131 
106 0.216 
107 0.211 
Table 2. 
 
These WNOM values can be analyzed against electoral margins to see if there are 
any correlations between high WNOM values and high electoral margins. This measure 
would simply be the WNOM value at point (t). As will be discussed shortly, although this 
is an effective way to measure ideological change, it not the soundest model. In the 
previous example, Mr. Shays’ congressional record shows a trend of becoming more 
conservative with increasing seniority, yet the unique changes within the trend will 
indicate whether individual elections are affecting his decision-making. The change in 
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DW Ideology for Representative Shays, as indicated by the best line depicted in Table 1, 
would be an approximate conservative shift of 0.012 for each Congress he has served. 
 Although it seems useful to use Poole’s WNOM to decipher the change in 
ideology across congressional terms, using this variable would present a methodological 
problem. Poole’s WNOM variable simply uses WNOM score for each congressman in a 
given Congress, creating a value to correlate with other variables, in this case, electoral 
margins.  
Poole touched on this topic in a 1993 study where he subtracted WNOM at (t-1) 
from WNOM (t) to find the difference between two Congresses. Yet, the straight WNOM 
scores present a problem with this process. This study intends to isolate electoral stress as 
the cause for congressional ideological moderation. Many studies, including the seniority 
measure of this study, have indicated that there is a correlation between seniority and 
ideology. While some studies (Strattman, 2000; Elling, 1982) have suggested a negative 
correlation between seniority and ideological polarization, there are others that have 
suggested the opposite result. However, it seems certain that career trends in ideology do 
exist for many congressional leaders, whether positive or negative, and must be dealt 
with to isolate the remainder of unexplained ideological change. 
 Therefore, to remove career trend data from the explanatory variable, these data 
must be subtracted from the WNOM margins between each Congress. Poole and Romer’s 
study in 1993 found no connection between electoral margins and ideology, however 
there were several problems with their study. First, Poole did not subtract this trend data, 
which he acknowledges in his most recent writing (2005). According to Poole, the DW 
trend line should be subtracted because it enables us “to compute a shift distance for 
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every legislator between Congresses, controlling for the linear time trend” (Poole, 2004, 
173). Thus, this study employs Poole’s most updated theoretical process by subtracting 
the DW trend line from the change in WNOM, effectively leaving the remaining 
ideological change possibly explained by electoral pressure, as this study suggests. 
Throughout this paper, this will be referred to as either the “complex” model, or as the 
distance between the change in WNOM minus the change in DW (DCWDDW). This is 
shown for Congressman Shays in Table 3: 
 
Congress WNOM Change 
WNOM 
DW-
NOMINATE 
Change 
DW_Ideology 
DCWDDW 
100 0.066 --- 0.078 --- --- 
101 0.108 0.042 0.090 0.017 0.025 
102 0.123 0.015 0.102 0.017 -0.002 
103 0.120 -0.003 0.115 0.017 -0.020 
104 0.149 0.029 0.127 0.018 0.011 
105 0.131 -0.018 0.139 0.017 -0.035 
106 0.216 0.085 0.151 0.017 0.068 
107 0.211 -0.005 0.164 0.017 -0.022 
Table 3. 
Although the remaining margin values become very small in many cases, this is a critical 
process of the study.   
 Nevertheless, the DCWDDW process is not the final step in transforming the 
central dependent variable of the “Complex Model” of this study. To run the data set 
together, the WNOM scores must be put into partisan form. In effect, the -1 to 1 scale 
must be transformed into a positive scale to keep Democratic and Republican data from 
moving in opposite directions. Thus, the main dependent variable for the Complex Model 
becomes partisan distance (PDCWDDW). To construct this variable, the partisan 
measure is the same as the main distance measure for Republicans, but for Democrats, 
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ideology is multiplied by -1. All third party representatives are coded as missing. Many 
studies focus on incumbents versus challengers or Republicans versus Democrats, 
however, the crux of this study is the electoral security of each representative. Shifting 
the scale positive for both parties enables the regression analyses to be run on the full 
data set, and subsequently to show simultaneous shifts between ideological extremity and 
moderation for both Republicans and Democrats. 
 
C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
To study the effect of electoral vote margins upon ideology, it is important to use 
a variety of other variables that have been studied by other scholars. Although many of 
these variables will be important in discussing the exact effects of congressional 
ideological shifts and electoral margins, they will mostly serve as control variables. By 
using control variables in conjunction with the main independent variable, the results of 
the study will hold more weight. Moreover, additional variables enable the data to be 
compared and contrasted with previous scholarly studies on congressional behavior. 
The main independent variable for this study will be vote margins in 
congressional elections. Primary documentation of election results is critical in 
developing a statistical analysis on electoral pressure. These results, for the House of 
Representatives, were distributed by Gary King (1994), through the Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, and also, through the Office of the Clerk 
(Election Statistics, 2005). Yet, to wholly examine voting behavior, there are a number of 
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extremely useful formats for election results. First, for congressional elections, a vote 
count “by-district” would be necessary to compose the election return margins that will 
be cross-examined against the dependent variable of congressional voting behavior. 
Election totals consist of vote totals, by district, for the Republican and Democratic 
candidate in each election.  
Because of the official nature of such data, they are quite reliable. Election returns 
from earlier congresses often provided conflicting and erroneous data, which is why they 
are omitted. Gary King’s election data, which begin in the 56th Congress, proved to be 
extremely reliable through cross-checking the numbers with those of the US Clerk, and 
so the 56th Congress is where the regression data begin for this study. Logically, electoral 
vote margins serve as an important indicator of constituent ideology and approval, two 
factors critical to incumbent representatives in their pursuit of reelection.  
Methodologically, several by-products of this basic election data create the main 
independent variable for this study. First, Winning Percent Margin is a critical variable, 
and it is defined as the percentage difference in votes between the winner and loser of 
each election. This variable is used for the Simple Model, which contrasts Winning 
Percent Margin against WNOM. Winning percent margin allows a regression to measure 
whether elevated winning percentages correlate with ideological extremity.  
Meanwhile, Change in Winning Percent Margin serves as the main independent 
variable in the “Complex” Model. How has the electoral security of each representative 
increased or decreased since the previous election? Effectively, this variable measures 
whether each election for Congressman X is becoming more or less difficult. Change in 
Winning Percent is constructed by taking the difference between the Winning Percent 
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Margin at (t) and the Winning Percent Margin at (t-1). It is then juxtaposed against 
PDCWDDW to illuminate shifts within already heightened electoral margins or 
ideological extremity. For example, while Winning Percent Margin might show that a 
60% margin of victory will correlate with a 0.5 ideology, using Change in Winning 
Percent as the independent variable enables the regression to note any corresponding 
ideological shifts when that margin increases to 65% in the following term. 
As previously mentioned, the data set originally included all House Members and 
terms between the 56th and 107th Congresses, however several omissions must be made. 
In unique circumstances, election data was coded as -9 within Gary King’s data set. 
Circumstances where this occurred include elections involving independent parties, and 
other irregularities. In most instances, these data were removed. Also, there were 
instances where Republican or Democratic candidates ran completely unopposed, without 
election. King coded such data as -1, and this occurred most prevalently in Louisiana, 
Florida, and several other Southern states. These data were also removed in most 
instances. The quantity of figures used for each regression is recorded within the tables 
located in the upcoming section of results. 
Additionally, region of the country is an important variable in studying 
congressional ideology. The nation will be coded by region and by state. James Campbell 
(1992) has done a great deal of research on state and regional voting patterns, and has 
actually devised an equation that uses several variables to predict how a state will vote in 
presidential elections. It is expected that regions that are generally more conservative or 
liberal will be represented by congressmen whose ideologies are particularly polarized. 
The South and West will be notably conservative, while the Northeast will be notably 
25 
liberal. Most important to these analyses will be the Northeast and West, as the South 
displays numerous electoral anomalies and realignment that may affect its role as a 
control (Jacobson, 2004, 237). 
Party will also serve as a variable, but in combination with region. The two 
interact together, and are used separately in discussing whether certain regions are 
represented by more ideologically polarized representatives. Party is coded as 0 for 
Democratic House members and 1 for Republican House members. Congressional voting 
behavior is influenced by party pressure, and party affiliation also works strongly with 
regional politics. Regions that are generally more conservative or liberal will exhibit 
strong party affiliation, and therefore, display more extreme viewpoints on issues. 
Further, tenure in office is measured within this study in absolute terms, by the 
number of terms a congressman has served in office. Thomas Strattman (2000) has 
approached congressional behavior from the angle of tenure. According to Strattman’s 
research, junior congressmen are more likely to vote with their party line, and party 
voting decreases with seniority. Also, congressmen who have served longer in office will 
exhibit less ideological shift than their shorter-tenured colleagues. Seniority plays a 
crucial role, as approximately 80% of the congressional data points in the study involve 
congressmen who have served two or more terms. It is expected that congressmen who 
have served longer in office will hold more extreme viewpoints. 
Similar to tenure, a critical variable for this study is whether the winning 
candidate in a given race was an incumbent. For this study, incumbents were coded as 1, 
while all challengers, open seat races, multiple incumbent races, and other possibilities 
are coded as 0. Incumbency plays a similar role to seniority in this study, as incumbency 
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helps identify trends of tenured congressmen. Yet, incumbency is also important because 
it identifies all unique races that do not feature an incumbent versus a challenger, which 
occurs about 22% of the time between 1898 and 2002 (Arnold, 1990, 49-51). 
Another variable of study is presidential election results, by state. A count of 
presidential election results “by-district” would be the most effective independent 
variable to juxtapose against electoral and congressional voting results. Will a president’s 
level of popularity within a given representative’s district create any voting variation? 
However, these data were unattainable, leaving statewide data as the only alternative. 
Presidential vote margins and data are calculated through the same procedures as 
congressional election results (absolute difference and percentage difference). There are 
two variables which are used in the regression models as controls. The first variable used 
codes whether the winning president is of each congressman’s party, coded as “0” if 
different, and “1” if the same. Second, the statewide percentage margin of the presidential 
candidate of a congressman’s party is used within the regression models. Scholars 
suggest that presidential elections have a moderate effect on congressional elections, and 
this variable will be studied as it correlates with success of same party candidates. This 
variable is significant, as previous research has suggested that presidential success has a 
negative effect on the success of opposing party congressional candidates.  
Moreover, presidential results serve as a safeguard against ideological regions that 
have the potential to skew the congressional data. In regions where representatives are 
more moderate than the median voter, vanishing congressional electoral margins would 
lead to increased ideological polarity, as an attempt to corral a larger cross-section of 
supporters. Unfortunately, presidential results by district are unavailable to use for this 
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purpose, which leaves statewide results. Even so, presidential results within the data set 
help to identify and control for such highly polarized regions. 
Additionally, Thorson and Stambough (1995) have studied the effects of 
presidential coattails, and believe it to be an important factor of electoral margins. Some 
suggest that coattails have an effect on close congressional races. Buck (1972) asserts that 
congressmen will actually shift their policy support in favor of the president when the 
president commands a substantial margin of victory in their districts. Consequently, there 
should be a positive relationship between presidential success in a district and the success 
of congressional candidates of the same party in that district. This second dimension of 
Presidential success adds to the effectiveness of presidential election results as a control 
within the regression analysis. 
Institutional structures of divided government and divided Congress will be 
studied to see how each affects congressional voting behavior. Divided government 
occurs when the executive branch is controlled by a different party than the majority 
party in Congress. Divided Congress occurs when the House and Senate are each 
controlled by a different party. John Coleman (1999) has argued that divided government 
leads to legislative moderation, but lowers productivity.  
For this study, several controls related to divided or unified government and 
Congress are used. First, the variable Divided Government is coded as 0 in the case of 
unified government and is coded as 1 in the case of divided government.  Second, the 
variable Unified Congress is coded as 0 during unified Congress and is coded as 1 when 
Congress is divided. Third, the percentage of seats in the entire house that a 
congressman’s party holds will serve as another control factor for the House. Moreover, 
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the percentage of seats in the senate that a representative’s party holds is a control factor. 
Government and Congressional institutional controls are effective within regression 
models to ensure that unique institutional factors are not skewing member ideological 
results.  
Last, ideological side is an important variable for several of the regressions. For 
several of the regression models (which will be discussed in the methods section), 
ideological distance served as the main dependent variable of the model. Thus, 
ideological side is an important control variable, as it codes whether the member’s 
ideological mean is less than or equal to zero (a liberal), or greater than zero (a 
conservative). There are House members whose ideological score sit on the opposite side 
of the spectrum from their party. In such cases, holding that representative’s party as his 
main ideological classification could distort the data. For instance, if a Republican with a 
-0.2 rating moved to a 0.0 rating in the next congressional term, standard classification 
would categorize that Republican as becoming increasingly moderate, when, in actuality, 
he is becoming more conservative. Thus, ideological side keeps unique ideological cases 
from damaging the effectiveness of the model. This effect is shown in the representation 
below: 
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Essentially, what this diagram shows is that although Republican Congressman X 
may move toward 0, he is becoming more extreme. In itself, this idea is somewhat 
counterintuitive, yet it is important to understand. The assumption of this study is that 
Republicans and Democrats are ideologically extreme, and correspond to the ideology of 
their own party. Democrats are close to -1, while Republicans are close to 1. Thus, for a 
Republican, any move in the direction of -1 is ideological moderation, while any move 
toward 1 is becoming more ideologically extreme. For a Democrat, the exact opposite is 
true. Essentially, the actual starting position of representative along the spectrum does not 
matter; it is the direction of the shift that is significant. 
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
 
The working theory of this study is that legislators in Congress are inherently 
ideologically extreme. To study such a theory, a variety of methods can be used. For this 
particular research project, the design will focus on linear regression analysis and 
correlation studies of the previously discussed variables. Most importantly, primary 
documentation of election results is critical in developing a statistical analysis on 
electoral pressure.  
There are two main types of design that can be used for the regression analysis 
within this study; pooled cross-sectional regression, and cross-sectional time-series 
regression. A pooled cross-sectional analysis involves individual members stacked within 
individual groups. For this particular study, congressmen are not uniform across each 
Congress, making this method somewhat unusable. Although pooled regression can be 
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used for basic correlations of election and ideological data, a more versatile regression 
model is necessary for this analysis. Instead, this study uses a cross-sectional time-series 
model. Because members overlap across different sections of the data set, the regression 
must be put together as a time-series. 
Additionally, a cross-sectional time-series regression with lags is used for this 
data set. Because each Congress is essentially its own static entity, it makes sense to use 
this statistical method. Lagged regression controls for first-order autocorrelation, as it 
recognizes that while the data is connected and a trend exists within the data set, different 
Congresses may act as distinct groups in certain situations.  
The actual regression data will be run using the statistical program STATA. There 
are several measures within the regression data which are used to decipher the validity of 
the regression measures. The first important measure is the overall R-squared measure for 
each run of the data set. The R-squared measure indicates how much variance within the 
data can be explained by the main variable. For most analyses discussed in the 
forthcoming section, the R-squared measurement is above 0.1. 
Moreover, the regression data include a measure that shows the confidence that a given 
probability percentage of the data falls within two standard deviations. For most studies, 
a 95% confidence interval is the general cutoff. Within such a deviation spread, the P > | 
z | measure should be below 0.05 to provide significant results. However, the data for this 
study does not lie within a standard deviation spread. The theory itself leads to a 
suggestion that the data falls in a directional pattern. Because of the directional nature of 
this data set, an acceptable probability interval would include 90% of the data. Similarly, 
the P > | z | measure must be below 0.1 for values to have significance.  
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III. Results 
 
A. FULL DATA SET 
 
The function of this study is to show that a relationship exists between electoral 
margins and House member ideological polarity. Through several models of regression 
analysis, a relationship is found between these two variables. This study uses two 
particular models which have been discussed in the previous section. The first model, 
termed the Simple Model, involves the WNOM variable and Winning Percent Margins 
for members of the House. Essentially, this model measures whether representatives in 
the House become more or less extreme over time with increasing electoral margins.  
 One of the main benefits of this study is that it involves mostly complete data 
over the last 106 years of congressional history. As such, the most important regression 
was run using the full data set. As can be seen in Table 4 at the back of this paper, 
variable of interest, Winning Percent Margin, was statistically insignificant in the Simple 
Model. This occurs for several possible reasons. First, this model uses electoral margins 
rather than change in margins. Second, the Simple Model correlates whether a positive 
relationship exists between high margins and extreme ideology by comparing the data 
with dummy variables. While this method is not incorrect, it may be too simple for such 
an expansive data set, as individual congresses are not necessarily comparable. 
 Thus, the Complex Model, using PDCWDDW, is the most effective model. Poole 
and Romer (1993) used WNOM at time (t) minus WNOM at time (t-1) for their original 
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study.  While Poole and Romer’s independent variable of electoral margins obtained 
insignificant results, additional characteristics of their study should be noted. As 
previously mentioned, Poole (2005) discussed several shortcomings of his model. Poole 
advocated subtracting the DW line from the WNOM data for future regressions, which 
has been done in the Complex Model for this study. Additionally, the variable within this 
study has been transformed into a positive scale using the partisan measure. 
Consequently, the PDCWDDW measure is an improved version of Poole’s most recent 
research.  
 The Complex Model (Table 4) indicates a positive relationship between Change 
in Winning Percent and PDCWDDW. The P > | z | measure of 0.077 and R-squared of 
0.1379 indicate that the positive coefficient is statistically significant. Because the 
dependent variable measures partisan ideological change, this value essentially means 
that as representatives increase their winning margins, their ideology becomes more 
extreme.  
 Yet, Poole and Romer (1993) still looms when reviewing this result. While 
several of the reasons for their insignificant measure of ideology and electoral margins 
have been listed, there is one additional reason. Poole and Romer’s data set spanned the 
80th to 97th Congresses. Of course, the choice of using these particular Congresses was 
not made because of the electoral margins control variable within their study. Thus, there 
are two potentially critical problems with this choice. First, the data set for their study is 
somewhat small, in contrast with the more extensive analysis provided in this study (56th 
Congress to the 107th Congress). Using a larger set of data helps to control for short-term 
confounding variables. Secondly, scholars have noted the rise of strong parties during the 
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early 1980s, which corresponds with the 97th Congress. Strong party structure has a 
considerable impact on ideological shirking, and will be discussed later in this section. In 
essence, Poole and Romer’s study may lack the most vital years of Congressional 
ideological polarization, making the data of this study’s Complex Model a noteworthy 
upgrade. 
 Upon review of the model, the results of the remaining variables are consistent 
with previous scholarly analyses. The Seniority variable is significant, and indicates a 
positive correlation with changing electoral margins. Many previous studies on 
congressional tenure have noted this relationship. Meanwhile, the President of Your Party 
variable is significant and positive. This relationship effectively represents that the party 
in control is slightly more extreme than the party not in power. This may indicate that 
members of the majority party have enough access to power that they are better able to 
take stronger ideological positions. Congressmen within the minority party may hold 
moderate partisan positions to counterbalance a lack of access to the presidency.  
Similarly, during times of divided Congress and divided government, the 
Complex Model provides significant results that representatives become increasingly 
ideological. The correlations provided by the model are positive, with fairly significant 
90% confidence values. These results may indicate that member ideological polarity is 
more common during divided government. It is possible that during periods of divided 
government, a stronger adversarial system develops within the House and Senate. 
Essentially, both vertical and horizontal divisions in Congress correlate with an 
increasing polarization of Congress. 
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Lastly, the PDCWDDW variable with lags provides a negative correlation with 
electoral margin shifts. Effectively, this means that when a representatives ideology 
becomes more extreme, he is pressured to bring his position back toward the middle, 
leading to a general decrease in the rate of change in ideology during the following term. 
At the same time, the lagged term for the Simple Model was significant and positive. 
While these two models would seem on first glance to contradict each other, in fact they 
do not. The dynamic of this relationship is shown in the illustration below: 
The above illustration represents a general conclusion that might be inferred from 
both the Simple and the Complex Model.  The significant and positive lagged dependent 
term in the Simple Model suggests that there is a positive trend of a member’s ideology 
over time. Effectively, representatives tend to become more ideological the longer that 
they are in Congress.  The significant but negative lagged dependent term in the Complex 
Model suggests that the rate of the ideological change over time decreases. In other 
words, members may asymptotically reach close to an equilibrium ideology.  
Although the Simple Model may not work well on Winning Percent Margins and 
ideology, much of the remainder of the data prove to be quite significant as controls. 
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Because the Simple Model uses the same data set as the Complex Model, the results 
shown in Table 4 depict the veracity of the hypotheses. Variables for the Northeast, West, 
Party, and Seniority were all highly significant and positively correlated with ideology. 
For region, the regression results indicate that House members from the Northeast and 
West are generally more ideologically extreme than members from the South. This is a 
logical result, as these regions are accepted by scholars as being ideologically extreme 
and more uniform than the South. 
 
B. FULL DATA SET, BY PARTY 
 
Breaking down the data by party provides some of the most intriguing results, as 
shown in Table 5. The Democratic Party seems to follow the theory within this study 
much more closely than the Republican Party. For Democrats, using the Simple Model, 
House winning percent is significant and positive, with an impressive R-squared value of 
0.8161. Over time, Democrats solidly increase margins and ideology. The Complex 
Model echoes the results of the Simple Model, providing a significant and positive 
relationship with an R-squared value of 0.1334. Accordingly, Democratic representatives 
in the House may be particularly constrained by electoral factors. 
 Meanwhile, according to regression analysis of the data, the same cannot be said 
about Republicans. Winning Percent and Change in Winning Percent led to insignificant 
results for both the Simple and Complex Models. Although this study presents no exact 
explanation for this insignificance within the Republican data, it is likely that some 
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intrinsic dissimilarity may exist between the party structures of the Democratic and 
Republican parties. To study this relationship, it would be necessary to include additional 
measures of party strength, cohesion, and leadership to interpret variation of party line 
voting across each party. 
 Nevertheless, both Democratic and Republican data provide several strong control 
measures to endorse these findings. While it would seem that perhaps the Republican 
data is incomplete, many of the other measures provide significant and expected results. 
For example, in Table 5, it can be seen that Republicans have a significant and negative 
correlation in the Northeast. This means that Republicans in the Northeast trend more 
moderate over time, which, in light of the increasing liberalization of the Northeast, 
seems as expected. Similarly, the lagged PCDWDDW variable works in the same 
directions for the Simple and Complex Models for both Republicans and Democrats, 
helping to indicate that there is not a specific problem with the Republican data. The 
substantiation of this Republican data leads to questions concerning how Republicans and 
Democrats handle changing electoral margins differently. 
 Yet, what are the implications of this difference? Several possibilities can be 
conjectured to explain this discrepancy. First, it is possible that Democrats are simply 
better at being responsive to the electorate. When electoral margins widen, they 
predictably and uniformly move toward their own ideologically polar stances. 
Effectively, Democrats are particularly exhibitive of the popular model of representation. 
Electoral slack allows Democrats to polarize, but otherwise, Democrats moderate their 
stances to maintain office and mirror the ideology if their constituency. 
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 Meanwhile, Republicans seem to ignore cues from the constituency. Republicans 
do not shift their ideology congruent to shifts in electoral margins. What can explain this 
facet of Republican representation? It is possible that Republicans exhibit the trustee 
model of representation. In essence, Republicans believe that the constituency entrusts in 
them the responsibility to vote their conscience. Regardless of shrinking electoral 
margins, Republicans do not shift their ideology. If this is the case, Republicans can be 
seen as inflexible in their ideological positions, unwilling to stay ideologically 
representative of their shifting districts. 
 
C. PARTIAL DATA SET, BY WEAK/STRONG PARTIES 
 
In the prior discussion concerning Poole and Romer (1993), it is mentioned that 
their study did not include data from the period of strong parties. This period includes the 
97th Congress up through present day Congress, or the 107th for this study. Scholars have 
identified a strong rise in party cohesion, party leadership, and ideological separation 
during this period (Poole,1997; Abramowitz, 2001). A representation of party 
polarization from Keith Poole’s website is shown below: 
 
38 
(Graph courtesy of Keith Poole, http://voteview.com/Polarized_America.htm)
During strong party periods, as witnessed in the last twenty-five years, rising 
electoral margins more strongly correlate with polarized ideology. The basic theory 
behind this study is that congressmen are inherently ideologically extreme, and it is 
elections that reel members back into the moderate viewpoints shared by mainstream 
America. In essence, party polarization helps to shield incumbent congressmen. At the 
same time, the electorate itself becomes polarized, leaving Representatives adequately 
able to manifest their ideological polarity. 
 The aforementioned theoretical basis for ideological extremity during strong party 
periods is corroborated within this study by the Complex Model. In fact, while the 
Complex Model is statistically demanding, the data for the strong parties regression 
provides the strongest coefficient and most significant measure (P > |z| = 0.02) of all 
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PDCWDDW model regressions up to this point. Ideological shirking by members is thus 
affected by the political atmosphere within which it occurs. 
 As expected, periods of weak parties provide insignificant results of ideological 
shift by Representatives. When party structure is weak, incumbents are not protected by a 
strong party structure and ideological divide. The electorate becomes increasingly 
moderate, which serves to reel Congressman further toward the middle, in spite of rising 
electoral returns. Party structure in Congress may be a critical component to member 
ideological shirking.   
 
D. STRONG PARTIES: A CLOSER LOOK 
 
Because Republican and Democratic data varied immensely for the full data set, it 
would be expected that a congruent variation will occur within the partial data set. The 
Democratic data for the full data set was particularly effective in showcasing the 
relationship advocated by this study, and subsequently, the Democratic data for strong 
parties should be increasingly effective. The results of this regression reverberate this 
expectation (Table 7), with the coefficient for the Democratic split of the strong party 
data at 0.012, the highest overall significant value for PDCWDDW, and with a P > |z| of 
only 0.016. Basically, when party structure and polarization is strong, as is the case in 
today’s political arena, Democrats are particularly restrained by electoral margins. 
 Similar to the results of the full dataset, Republican measures are insignificant for 
strong party regressions (Table 7). Because of the strength of ideological shirking within 
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strong parties, it is surprising that Republican values remain insignificant for both the 
Simple and Complex Models. The institutional factors that create this inconsistency 
between Republicans and Democrats clearly remains steadily in existence through 
periods of both weak and strong parties. 
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IV. FINAL THOUGHTS 
 
Elected officials in the United States maintain a unique and shifting relationship 
with their constituents, creating interplay between a representative’s ideological 
extremity and his desires to maintain political office. As election margins grow and the 
offices of congressmen become safe, they more readily exhibit their intrinsic ideological 
polarity. This study answers several questions about elections and ideology, while 
creating several others. Is representative ideological moderation bad for democracy, or is 
it a useful mechanism to counterbalance innate political extremity within our elected 
officials? While an answer to this question is not resolved by this study, it is a fascinating 
matter that must be decided by the electorate. 
Additionally, the innate differences between the Republican and Democratic 
parties shown within this study are an interesting topic of discussion. While Democrats 
and Republicans are typically thought to only differ in their ideological stances, there 
actually appears to be a more dynamic relationship between the two parties. Why do 
Republicans seemingly ignore shifts in electoral success when formulating their 
ideological positions? Why are Democrats more willing to ideologically polarize when 
gauging an electoral vote of confidence from their constituents? Effectively, the 
underlying perception of representation within each party may be unique. While 
Democrats are more responsive to electoral cues by the electorate, Republicans are more 
static, taking a trustee approach to representation. Recognizing such an intrinsic 
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difference between the Democratic and Republican parties is critical in understanding 
party and member behavior. 
Nevertheless, what is the utilitarian usefulness for society to understand 
representative ideological moderation? What is the value of this study for the average 
voter? While on first glance it may only seem to provide interesting reading material for 
academics and those captivated by politics, the correlation between election margins and 
ideology within this study is, in fact, vital to the electorate. Foremost, by understanding 
how election results affect congressional representation, the electorate can determine the 
effectiveness of political activism. While a majority of representatives occupy safe seats 
in the House, this study indicates that reducing an incumbent victor’s electoral margins 
can help to moderate his policies in future Congresses. Cues by the electorate play a 
larger role within the voting decisions of incumbent Representatives than is assumed by 
the average American. This study itself serves as a potent endorsement for increased 
voter participation, even in districts where challengers lack the resources and support to 
closely challenge an incumbent Representative.  
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